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Abstract
Buse’s concept of total response is extended to advertising effects. Results suggest that partial 
advertising elasticities overstate advertising’s ability to increase market demand. One 
implication is that advertising bans (e.g., for alcohol and tobacco) are apt to be less effective than 
indicated by partial advertising elasticities estimated from econometric models. Extending the 
concept of total response to price effects, the total advertising “flexibility” sets the lower bound 
on the optimal advertising-sales ratio and subsumes the Dorfman-Steiner and Nerlove-Waugh 
theorems as special cases. Applying the total flexibility concept to U.S. meats, results suggest 
the beef, pork and poultry industries are under-investing in advertising. However, in the case of 
beef this conclusion hinges on the assumption that retaliation by pork brand advertisers is 
minimal, which needs to be tested.
Key words: advertising bans, Dorfman-Steiner theorem, generic advertising, total elasticities
Relationship between Partial and Total Responses to Advertising
with Application to U.S. Meats
In a classic paper, Buse introduced the concept of the “total demand response curve” and showed 
that in general it is less elastic than the Marshallian demand curve of neo-classical theory. He 
argued that the total concept is important because it gives theory greater predictive content. 
Specifically, Marshallian demand elasticities are of limited use for prediction purposes because 
they assume that the prices of all commodities except the one in question are constant, which in 
general is not true in a free-market situation. The total demand elasticity, by relaxing this aspect 
of the ceteris paribus assumption, moves demand theory closer to reality by providing a more 
accurate basis for prediction.
The purpose of this research is to extend to advertising Buse’s idea of total elasticity. 
Specifically, we determine whether the partial advertising elasticity of neo-classical theory (e.g., 
Basmann) is larger or smaller than the total advertising elasticity, which relaxes the assumption 
that all prices are fixed. This relationship is important because advertising elasticities are used to 
predict how advertising bans might achieve certain policy goals such as reduced consumption of 
alcohol or tobacco. Since advertising-ban studies base their predictions on partial advertising 
elasticities (see, e.g., reviews by Duffy and by Saffer), it would be useful to know whether such 
predictions overstate or understate the actual consumption impact when price effects are taken 
into account.
In an agricultural context, partial advertising elasticities are often used to gauge the extent
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to which generic advertising might enhance demand or revenue for the promoted commodity 
(see, e.g., Brester and Schroeder; Kinnucan et al. (1997, 2001); Le, Kaiser, and Tomek; 
Richards, Van Ispelen, and Kagan). Since generic advertising in general affects price as well as 
quantity, predictions based on partial advertising elasticities are apt to be misleading. As well, 
increased advertising by one commodity group (e.g., beef) might invite retaliation by another 
group (e.g., pork or poultry), which would tend to undercut the original group’s advertising 
impact. Retaliatory responses are taken into account in the total response relationships derived 
in this study. Although the issues addressed here are not new (Alston, Freebairn and James; 
Kinnucan (1996); Piggott, Piggott, and Wright), no study to our knowledge provides a clear 
statement of the relationship between partial and total advertising responses. Knowledge of this 
relationship provides theoretical insight into actual market responses to advertising, but also has 
the practical advantage of simplifying partial equilibrium models designed to indicate generic 
advertising’s net effect on farm price (see, e.g., Kinnucan and Myrland).
The analysis begins by considering the two-good case. The analysis is then generalized 
to n goods and applied to meat advertising (beef, pork, and poultry) to highlight principles. The 
main findings are summarized in the concluding section.
2-Good Case
To fix ideas, we begin with the simple case in which the important substitution effects are 
limited to two goods, say butter (q{) and margarine (q2). Each good is advertised and prices for
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the two goods are determined under competitive conditions.1 The goods are substitutes in 
consumption, i.e., an advertising-induced increase in the price of one good increases the demand 
for the other good. On the supply side, production is sufficiently specialized that the two goods 
may be considered independent, i.e., changes in the price of one good have no effect on the 
supply of the other good. (This assumption, which is a departure from Buse’s analysis, is made 
for analytical convenience: relaxing the assumption complicates the total elasticity expressions 
with no new economic insight.) With these assumptions, the model expressed in terms of 
percentage changes in the relevant variables is:
(1) q1* = 011 P1* + 012 P2
(2) #2* = 021 P1* + 022 P2
(3) q1* = ,1 P1*
(4) #2* = ,2 P2*
11
J21
>12 '
22
where the asterisks denote relative change (e.g., q1* = dq1/q1), p i is price of good i, ai is 
advertising expenditure on good i, 0ij are price elasticities of demand, $ij are advertising 
elasticities, and ei are supply elasticities.
For the remainder of the analysis we will assume that demand is downward sloping (0ii <
1 The assumption that prices are determined under competitive conditions is in line with 
how most commodity markets work. In situations where prices are determined under 
imperfectly competitive conditions, Baker and Bresnahan’s duopoly model represents an 
excellent point of departure (see also Leeflang and Wittink).
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0), supply is non-decreasing (e; > 0), the two goods are substitutes (0ij > 0, i * j ), and advertising 
causes the demand curve for the advertised good to shift to the right (Ph > 0) and the demand 
curve for the substitute good to shift to the left ($ij < 0, i * j ). In addition, we will assume that 
the own-price elasticities of demand are larger in absolute value than the cross-price elasticities, 
i.e., 10111 > 0 12 and 1022| > 021, a necessary condition for the multi-market equilibrium to be 
stable (Hicks, Ch. 5 and pp. 315-19).
Total Price Elasticity
In Buse’s analysis the total price elasticities were obtained by treating the own-price as 
exogenous. Thus, for example, in the above system the total own-price elasticity for good 1 
(011T) is obtained by dropping (3), setting a 1* = a2* = 0 (to isolate the price effect), and solving 
the remaining equations simultaneously for q1*/p1* to yield:
(5) 011T = 011 + 012 .21
where . 21 = 021/(e2 - 022) is the “price response elasticity” that measures the percent change in 
the substitute’s price per 1% change in own-price.2 By the stability condition* 0 111 > 0 12 and 0 <
2In the industrial organization and marketing literatures (e.g., Baker and Breshahan; 
Chintagunta, Rao, and Vilcassim; Cotterill and Putsis; Putis and Dhar) . 21 is referred to as a 
“price reaction elasticity” to connote the fact that firms in imperfectly competitive markets have 
control over price. In the present analysis where strategic price responses are ruled out by the
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C21 < 1 (for normal-sloping supply and demand). Thus, the total price elasticity is negative and 
smaller in absolute value than the partial elasticity when goods are substitutes, i.e., 0 11 < 0 11T < 
0, which means the partial elasticity overstates the effect of a price change.
The reason is that with upward-sloping supply for the substitute good, an increase in the 
price of the own good causes the demand and price of the substitute good to increase, which 
increases the demand for the own good through second-round or feedback effects. This induced 
increase in the demand for the own good counterbalances the initial effect of the price rise. 
Consequently, failure to take into account the feedback effect, which is measured by the 
compound term 0 12 . 21 in (5), causes the own-price effect as measured by 0 11 to be exaggerated.
Total Advertising Elasticity
Equation (5) is instructive since intuitively one would expect a similar result for advertising. 
Specifically, since an increase in own advertising causes the demand and price of a substitute 
good to decrease (when its supply is upward sloping), this would tend to erode the demand for 
the advertised good through second-round or feedback effects. Thus, failure to take into account 
the feedback effect (as would be true if a partial elasticity was used to measure the effect) should 
result in the advertising effect being overstated.
To test this, and to provide an analogue to (5), we initially retain the assumption that p 1 is 
exogenous, set a 2* = 0 (to isolate good 1's advertising effect), and solve (1), (2), and (4) for
competitive market-clearing assumption, we use the term “price response elasticity” to highlight 
the passive nature of price adjustments when markets are perfectly competitive.
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q1*/a1*to yield:
(6) $ 11 ' = $ 11 + . 12 $21
where $ i i ' is good i's total advertising elasticity when its price is fixed, and . 12 = 0 12/(e2 - 022) is 
the “quantity response elasticity” that measures the percent change in the quantity of the 
advertised good per 1% change in the quantity of the substitute good.3 Since under the stated 
assumptions . 12 > 0 and $21 < 0, intuition is confirmed. That is, $ 11 > $11', which means that the 
partial elasticity overstates the advertising effect.
A basic difference between (5) and (6) is that under the stated assumptions (6)’s sign is 
uncertain. The reason is that . 12 is not constrained to be less than one, nor is $11 necessarily 
larger than |$211. Thus, the feedback effect . 12 $21, which is negative in sign, could dominate the 
direct effect $11, resulting in a negative total elasticity.
To identify conditions necessary to assure a positive sign for (6), we first invoke 
Basmann’s (p. 53) adding-up condition:
L i" Ri $ij = 0 (j = 1, 2, ..., n)
where Ri = p i qi/L i"p i q  is the rth good’s budget share. Thus, if  the cross effects of good i's 
advertising are confined to good 2, then $11 and $21 are related as follows:
R1 $11 + R2 $21 = ^
3That .12 = dlnqi/dlnq2 whereas .21 = dlnp2/dlnpi can be seen by replacing the structural 
elasticities in each expression with their mathematical counterparts (e.g., ei = (dqi/dpi)(pi/qi)) and 
then manipulating the expressions algebraically.
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which implies $n  > |$21| only if R1R2 < 1. Imposing this restriction on (6) yields:
(6a) $11" = $11 [1 - (R1/R2) .12],
which implies $11"  > 0 only if . 12 < R2/R1. That this restriction holds when income effects are 
small (or similar) can be shown by invoking the Hotelling-Jureen relation 0 12 * (R2/R1) 021, 
which implies . 12 * (R2/R1) . 21. Substituting the latter relation into (6a) yields:
(6b) $11" * $11 (1 - (21X
which, by virtue of the restriction on . 21 noted earlier, implies a positive total elasticity. In 
general, however, $11" ’s sign is uncertain.
Intuitively, relaxing the assumption that the advertised good’s price is exogenous should 
reduce the total elasticity further, because then price rationing in the own market becomes a 
factor. That is, with upward-sloping supply in the own-market, the demand shift will cause the 
own-good’s price to rise, which would tend to reduce consumption relative to the case where the 
own-good’s price is fixed. To check this, good 1's total advertising elasticity with endogenous 
price ($11T) is derived by first setting (1) = (3) and (2) = (4) to solve for the reduced-form 
elasticity p 1*/a1*. Equation (3) is then re-used to obtain:
(8) $11T = ($11 + .12 $21) R11 = $11 r R11
where R 11 = e 1 (e2 - 022)/D is an elasticity that indicates the price-rationing effect, and D  = [(e 1 - 
0 11) (e2 - 022) - 012 021] > 0. Since 0 # R 11 # 1 under the stated assumptions, | $11T | # | $11' | and 
intuition is confirmed. Thus, the simpler expression (6) and its variants place an upper limit on 
the total advertising elasticity. The extent to which $ 11' overstates $ 11T depends critically on e 1. 
For example, if e 1 = 0 (implying extreme price rationing), then $11T = 0 and $11' would tend to be
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a poor indicator of the total effect. This highlights the dangers of ignoring the supply side of the 
market when predicting advertising’s effect on consumption.
Price-Increase Equivalence Relation
A critical issue for alcohol and tobacco policy is whether a price increase (through an increase in 
the excise tax) may be more effective than an advertising restriction as a way to reduce 
consumption. One way to address this issue is to ask under what conditions price and 
advertising are equally efficient in the sense that a 1% increase in price would yield the same 
percentage decrease in consumption as a 1% decrease in advertising expenditure. To determine 
this, we set:
0 i iT = - $i iT,
and substitute (5) and (8) to yield:
(9) R11 = - (0 11 + 0 12 . 21 )/($ 11 + . 12 $21) = - 0 11T/Pl1'.
The above relation, which we call the “Price-Increase Equivalence” (PIE) relation, indicates that 
for price and advertising to be equally efficient the advertising response in some sense must be at 
least as large as the price response (since R 11 # 1).
To see this relationship more clearly, let $ 11' = $11 (1 - . 21), as would be true if cross­
effects are confined to good 2 and income effects of the induced price changes are small or 
similar between the two products. In this case the PIE relation reduces to - 0 11T/[$11 (1 - . 21)] #
1, which, since (1 - . 21) < 1, implies 
(9a) - 0 n T < $1 1 .
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Thus, for price policy to be more efficient than advertising policy, it is sufficient that the total 
price elasticity be at least as large as the partial advertising elasticity, i.e., 1011T | > $11.
Although this result is conditional on the indicated assumptions and thus must be treated with 
caution, it serves to illustrate that a simple comparison of the partial elasticities can be 
misleading. In particular, 10111 > $ 11 is no assurance that price policy is more efficient than 
advertising policy, since this comparison ignores feedback effects, which would tend to blunt the 
effect of the price increase.
Competitor Reaction
The analysis thus far assumes that a2 is constant. In reality, firms and industries monitor 
competitors’ advertising and use this information in setting advertising budgets and determining 
campaign strategy (see, e.g., Leeflang and Wittink). In the present model competitor reaction is 
analyzed by defining 6ji = aj*/ai* (> 0) as the “Competitor Response Elasticity” (CRE) that gives 
the percent change in competitor’s advertising per 1% change in own-advertising.4 Setting a 2* =
4 For an explicit analytic expression for CRE in terms of model parameters see Alston, 
Freebairn and James (p. 893, equation (26)). An interesting aspect of this expression is that 
CRE’s sign is uncertain. That is, an increase in own-advertising may elicit more or less 
advertising by a competing industry depending in part on the relative magnitude of spillover 
effects. In this study we assume that CRE is positive in sign, i.e., in Tirole’s terminology (see 
also Seldon, Banerjee, and Boyd and Erickson) advertising messages are viewed by the 
competing industries as strategic complements.
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*21 a 1* in (1) and (2), and for simplicity treatingp 1 as fixed, the total advertising elasticity for 
good 1 that takes into account competitor response (neglecting income effects) is:
(10) $11r .  [$11 - (R2/R0  $22 *21] (1 - .21)
Comparing (6b) and (10), competitor reaction tends to moderate the total elasticity, as expected. 
The attenuation increases as: (i) the competitor’s relative market share increases (larger R2/R1),
(ii) the competitor’s advertising becomes more effective at shifting demand (larger $22), and (iii) 
the retaliatory response increases (larger 621).
In fact, unlike (6b), (10)’ s sign is uncertain, which means that retaliation can cause a 
positive total advertising elasticity to turn negative. This tendency is greatest in situations where 
the rival industry (e.g., beef) dominates the market, as then R2/R1 would be large, especially from 
the perspective of “fringe” competitors (e.g., lamb or fish). (Stated differently, small industries 
would tend to be damaged more by retaliation than large industries.) The upshot is that 
competitor responses combine with price effects to reduce advertising impact. Thus, studies that 
treat either prices or competitor advertising as exogenous are apt to overstate advertising impact, 
perhaps significantly so.
Total Advertising Flexibility
The emphasis thus far on quantity effects in some sense is misplaced in that it is the price effects 
of advertising that are important from a welfare standpoint. In particular, for producers in the 
aggregate to benefit from advertising, the market price must rise.5 The net effect of good 1's
5With parallel shifts in demand, the change in producer surplus (PS) may be measured
10
advertising on own-price (a n T), hereafter referred to as good 1's total advertising “flexibility” (to 
borrow Houck’s terminology), is derived by solving (1) - (4) for the reduced-form elasticity 
p\*/a\*  to yield:
(11) " i iT = ($11 + .12 $21) H11 = $11 * H11
where Hn = (e2 - 022)/D $ 0 is an elasticity that indicates the ability of good 1's advertising to 
raise own price. For example, if  e 1 = then Hn = " 11T = 0 and the own-price effect is nil. 
Conversely, if e 1 = 0 and e2 = then h11 = 1/- 0 11 and . 12 = 0, in which case (11) reduces to a 11T 
= $11/- 0 11. This latter expression, as shown below, is identical to the Dorfman-Steiner theorem, 
and thus represents the largest own-price effect possible.
Comparing (8) and (11), Hn = R 11/e1, which implies $11T = e 1 a 11T. Thus, the total 
advertising elasticity is less than, equal to, or greater than the total advertising flexibility as own- 
supply respectively is inelastic, unitary elastic, or elastic. Since $11T’s sign is uncertain, the same 
is true for a 11T. Consequently, the welfare effects of advertising are a priori ambiguous (as 
noted by Kinnucan 1996).6
using the formula )P S i = p i qip i* (1 + q*) (e.g., Wohlgenant). Thus, i fp i* = 0 the welfare
gain to industry i is nil. A similar result follows for non-parallel shifts (Chung and Kaiser).
6The total flexibility can be easily extended to analyze situations where interest centers 
on revenue impacts rather than price or quantity impacts per se (e.g., Putsis and Dhar). 
Specifically, let l11t = a11T + $11T where l11t is good 1's total revenue elasticity. Substituting (8) 
and (11) yields l11 = a 11 (e1 + 1), or, more generally, Lii = a ii (ei + 1). Thus, advertising’s
11
Optimal Advertising Intensity
The flexibility’s relevance for optimal advertising policy can be seen by considering the special 
case where the substitute good’s supply is perfectly elastic (e2 = ~). In this case (11) reduces to:
( l la )  a n '  = $ii/(ei - 011) = 0 iNW
where 0 1N-W is Nerlove and Waugh’s expression for optimal intensity (advertising expenditure 
divided by industry revenue in producer-surplus maximizing equilibrium) for a competitive 
industry that raises funds for promotion through a lump-sum tax and where opportunity cost and 
substitution effects are ignored. From (11a) optimal intensity increases as consumers become 
more responsive to the advertising, and as demand or supply becomes less price elastic.
If good 1's supply is fixed, as might be true in a short-run situation, (11a) reduces to:
( llb )  a n "  = $n/- 011 = 01DS
where 0 1D-S is Dorfman and Steiner’s condition for optimal intensity for a monopoly (or industry 
cartel) with fixed output. Since substitution and supply response each lowers advertising’s 
ability to raise price, it follows that 0 1D-S = a 11' '  > a 11' > a 11T. Thus, the D-S theorem sets the 
upper limit on the total flexibility.
From the foregoing it may be inferred that optimal intensity and the total flexibility are 
related. In fact, if opportunity costs are zero, the flexibility sets the lower bound on optimal 
intensity. In particular, as shown in the appendix:
ability to enhance industry revenue depends fundamentally on its ability to raise price, and on the 
resulting supply response.
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(12) 0i° = “ nT/(p! + S i)
where 0i° is the ith industry’s optimal intensity, pi is opportunity cost, and S i is the portion of 
advertising costs borne by producers. In situations where advertising funds are raised via per- 
unit levies on industry output in a competitive market, a portion of the levy is shifted to 
consumers unless supply is fixed (Chang and Kinnucan), i.e., 0 < S i # 1. Thus, 0io > a iiT when 
pi = 0, as claimed.
Condition (12), which is a new result, generalizes Dorfman and Steiner’s and Nerlove 
and Waugh’s theorems in that it takes explicit account of supply response, tax shifting, and 
substitution effects. It is useful in that it provides a simple metric for determining whether 
advertising investments are too high or low. In particular, if
(13) “ iiT > 0i
where 0i is observed intensity, then an expanded advertising budget would be welfare increasing 
from industry i’s perspective (neglecting opportunity cost). Conversely, if  a iiT < 0i an expanded 
budget would be welfare decreasing, unless tax shifting was pronounced, i.e., S i was sufficiently 
less than one.
Returning to (12), this condition is based on the implicit assumption that an interior 
solution is optimal (see appendix). In reality, the boundary solution (no advertising) may yield a 
higher profit (quasi-rent). This would be true, for example, if the revenue generated by the 
advertising falls short of variable costs. Whether the latter is true can be determined from the 
“shut-down” condition (Hadar, p. 128):
(14) pio > AVCio + ao/qio
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wherep °  is equilibrium price consistent with advertising expenditure a°, AVC° is average 
variable cost consistent with equilibrium quantity q ° , and aio/qio is the per-unit advertising costs. 
Inequalities (13) and (14) taken together constitute the necessary and sufficient conditions for it 
to be profitable for industry i to engage in advertising. In particular, whether a iiT > 0i implies 
under-investment rests on the assumption that (14) is satisfied.
Condition (14) explains why petition drives to eliminate commodity promotion programs 
tend to appear during periods of economic stress (low commodity prices or high input prices), as 
is currently the case for beef and pork (Vansickle). From (14) it may be inferred that the 
producers most likely to mount such drives would be those with high variable costs, typically the 
under-capitalized or smaller operations.7
ft-Good Case
Although no new economic insights are gained from the «-good case, developing the model is 
useful since in most instances the advertised good will have more than one substitute. In 
addition, to add realism to the model, it would be useful to include the marketing channel. 
Accordingly, we express the relevant behavioral relationships in matrix notation as follows:
7In May 1999 19,000 signatures calling for a referendum on the pork checkoff program 
were forwarded to the USDA. These signatures were obtained by a group called the Campaign 
for Family Farms (Vansickle), which may be presumed to represent primarily small- and 
medium-sized operations. Beef producers have also called for a referendum, with some 126,000 
signatures turned into the USDA.
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(15) q* = 0  p* + $ a*,
(16) p* = n  w*,
(17) x* = e  w*,
(18) q* = x*,
where q* and x* are n x 1 vectors representing relative changes in quantities at the retail and
farm levels of the market, respectively (e.g., the first element of q* is d^1/^1); p* and w* are n x1 
vectors representing relative changes in prices at retail and farm; a* is an n x 1 vector 
representing relative changes in advertising expenditure; 0  and $ are n x n matrices of demand 
and advertising elasticities; e  is an n x n matrix of supply elasticities; and n  is an n x n diagonal 
matrix of farm-retail price transmission elasticities.
In this formulation substitution effects are permitted at the farm level, i.e., e  is not 
necessarily diagonal. However, by virtue of (18) we restrict the aggregate marketing technology 
to exhibit proportions. (For a discussion of the economic implications of this restriction, see 
Kinnucan (1997).)
The key relationships are the total (or reduced-form) elasticities for price and quantity at 
the farm level. The farm-price effects are obtained by substituting (15) - (17) into (18) and 
solving for w * to yield:
(19) w* = H a*,
where H = (e - 0  n )-1 $ is an n x n matrix of reduced-form elasticities that indicate the net effect
of isolated changes in advertising expenditure on farm prices. The total flexibilities
corresponding to (11) appear as the diagonal elements of H . The farm-quantity effects are
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obtained by back-substitution of (19) into (17) to yield:
(20) x* = e H a*.
The total advertising elasticities corresponding to (8) appear as the diagonal elements of e  H . 
Application
To demonstrate the model’s usefulness and to illustrate principles, (19) and (20) were applied to 
meat advertising in the United States using parameter values as detailed in table 1. The analysis 
assumes that substitution effects on the demand side are adequately represented by a four-good 
system consisting of beef, pork, poultry, and all other goods (n = 4). On the supply side 
producers are assumed to be sufficiently specialized so that cross-price elasticities of supply can 
be safely ignored (e is diagonal). At issue is whether meat advertising is welfare increasing from 
the producer perspective when cross-commodity substitution effects, supply response, and the 
marketing channel are taken into account.
Parameterization
The demand and advertising elasticities in table 1 are taken from Brester and Schroeder’s study. 
An advantage of Brester and Schroeder’s estimates over others in the literature (e.g., Kinnucan et 
al.) is that separate elasticity estimates are provided for generic and brand advertising, which 
permits an evaluation of each advertising approach. The elasticities are theoretically consistent 
in that the price elasticities satisfy the classical restrictions of homogeneity, symmetry, and 
adding-up; as well, the advertising elasticities satisfy Basmann’s adding-up condition.
Moreover, all cross-price elasticities are smaller in absolute value than own-price elasticities, as 
needed to satisfy the multi-market equilibrium condition. The price elasticities, which are
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Hicksian, indicate that all four products are net substitutes.
The supply elasticities for beef, pork, and poultry are set respectively to 0.15, 0.40, and 
0.90 to be consistent with estimates in the literature (table 1, note b). Since no estimates are 
available for other goods, e4 is set to 2, our “best guess” value. However, to determine the 
sensitivity of results to supply response, and to gauge the extent to which optimal intensity might 
be affected by length of run, we provide a “short-run” simulation that cuts the supply elasticities 
in half.
The farm-retail price transmission elasticities are set equal to the farmer’s share of the 
consumer dollar. The justification for this procedure is that the transmission elasticity converges 
to the farmer’s share when the aggregate marketing technology exhibits constant returns to scale 
and the supply curve for marketing inputs is perfectly elastic (Gardner; see also Kinnucan and 
Forker, p. 290, table 4, fn. b). Both assumptions are consistent with Wohlgenant’s analysis, and 
the latter has been shown to be innocuous (Kinnucan 1997). The transmission elasticity for other 
goods is set to unity since the farm-level impact is not relevant.
Observed advertising intensities, which correspond to 1993, the last year of Brester and 
Schroeder’s analysis, indicate that pork is the most intensively advertised meat (02 = 0.68% for 
combined generic and brand advertising) and beef the least (01 = 0.09%). By way of 
comparison, the median intensity for the 34 California commodities listed in Alston, Carman and 
Chalfant’s study (p. 161) is 1.13%.
Results
All total elasticities are smaller than their corresponding partial elasticities, as expected (table 2).
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The greatest difference occurs in the short run when supply is less elastic, in which case the total 
elasticities range from 17% (generic beef) to 87% (poultry) of their partial counterparts.
Although the long-run elasticities show less difference, with the exception of poultry the 
differences remain non-trivial (e.g., 30% for generic beef and 57% for brand pork). This 
suggests that in most cases partial advertising elasticities do indeed provide a poor basis for 
prediction.
Owing to inelastic supplies, the total flexibilities are larger than the total elasticities.
Still, the long-run total flexibilities are minute, less than 0.05. Thus, meat advertising has little 
scope for enhancing product value. For example, the short-run total flexibility for brand pork 
advertising is 0.067 and the total elasticity is 0.013, which means that a 10% increase in brand 
expenditure would raise pork value at the farm gate a mere 0.80% in the short run. (The long- 
run effect is 0.65%.) Thus, calls for increased pork advertising (Runningen) are not likely to 
have much effect in boosting depressed hog prices or farm revenue. This does not mean, 
however, that meat advertising is necessarily unprofitable. The reason is that advertising outlays 
are tiny in relation to product value (e.g., a2 = $69 million versus w 2x2 = $10.1 billion). Thus, it 
does not take much of a demand shift to recoup the investment.
In terms of optimizing behavior, with the maintained hypothesis that (14) is satisfied, it 
appears that the industries are under-investing in advertising, as the flexibility-intensity ratios are 
greater than one. The one exception is pork’s generic campaign, which, owing to its negative 
(effectively zero) total flexibility, is ineffectual.8 The Flexibility-Intensity Ratios (FIRs) decline
8Brester and Schroeder reach a similar conclusion based on the statistical insignificance
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as the time horizon lengthens, reflecting the inimical affects of supply response on advertising 
rents. Since the long-run FIRs are the most relevant for policy purposes, the remaining 
discussion will focus on these.
The FIR for brand beef advertising (206:1) is substantially larger than for generic 
advertising (14.5:1), which suggests that profits can be increased by diverting funds from generic 
to brand advertising. (Brand’s large FIR is due primarily to its tiny intensity (0 1B = 0.007%), 
since brand’s flexibility is only slightly larger than generic’s (a 11B = 0.014 versus a 11G = 0.012).) 
Similarly, since pork’s generic advertising is ineffectual and its brand advertising has a favorable 
FIR (8.2:1), it appears that the pork industry would be better off adopting a brand approach.
Overall it appears that to maximize quasi-rent beef producers would need to invest about 
2.6% of farm value in advertising and pork and poultry producers about 5%. These estimates, 
which are based on the long-run total flexibilities in table 2, need to be qualified. First, they 
implicitly assume that the underlying structural elasticities are invariant to advertising. In
of the own-advertising effect. However, as emphasized by Piggott, Piggott, and Wright, 
statistical significance of the own-advertising effect (or lack thereof) can be misleading with 
respect to economic impact. For example, generic pork advertising has a positive effect on beef 
demand and a negative effect on poultry demand, the latter being highly statistically significant; 
the former marginally so (Brester and Schroeder, p. 977). Thus, depending on the relative 
magnitudes of the feedback effects from these demand shifts into the pork market, it is possible 
for the advertising to have a positive effect on pork price even though it has no direct effect on 
pork demand.
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reality, advertising elasticities in particular are expected to decline as advertising increases due to 
diminishing returns (Simon and Arndt) and satiation effects (Kinnucan, Chang, and 
Venkateswaran), which would tend to reduce the optimal intensities. Second, the total 
flexibilities in table 2 implicitly assume that competitors’ advertising remains constant, which is 
unlikely to be the case.
Competitor Response
To gauge the importance of competitor response, we endogenize competitors’ advertising by 
replacing the a* in (15) with * i ai* where * i is a 4 x 5 matrix of competitor-response elasticities 
(CRE) under five scenarios. In analyzing these scenarios we restrict attention to brand 
advertising of pork and poultry and to generic advertising of beef, since generic advertising of 
pork is ineffectual, no generic advertising occurs for poultry, and brand expenditures for beef are 
modest and thus unlikely to provoke a response.
The five scenarios analyzed are: (i) no competitor response; (ii) an isolated 0.5% increase 
in competitor A’s adverting; (iii) an isolated 0.5% increase in competitor B ’s advertising; (iv) a 
combined 0.5% increase in both competitors’ advertising; and (v) a combined 1% increase in 
both competitors’ advertising. For beef, scenarios (i) - (v) are analyzed by setting columns 1 - 5 
o f*  1 equal to respectively (1, 0, 0, 0), (1, 0.5, 0, 0), (1, 0, 0.5,0), (1, 0.5, 0.5, 0) and (1, 1, 1, 0); 
for pork the column vectors of * 2 are (0, 1, 0, 0), (0.5, 1, 0, 0), (0, 1, 0.5, 0), (0.5, 1, 0.5, 0) and 
(1, 1, 1, 0); and for poultry the column vectors of * 3 are (0, 0, 1, 0), (0.5, 0, 1, 0), (0, 0.5, 1, 0), 
(0.5, 0.5, 1, 0) and (1, 1, 1, 0). Scenarios (ii) - (iv) indicate “halfway” responses to increases in 
own-advertising; scenario (v) indicates a full, or “in-kind,” retaliatory response. These scenarios
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are not m eant to  be exhaustive, bu t rather to provide insight into the potential im portance o f 
com petitor reaction (real or perceived) to  advertising budgeting decisions. For brevity, only the 
long-run total flexibilities are presented, since the total elasticities are derivative, and shortening 
the tim e horizon m erely intensifies the m easured price im pacts w ithout altering signs. Cross 
flexibilities are provided along w ith the direct flexibilities to  perm it evaluation o f  spillover 
effects.9
Results affirm  that com petitor responses have im portant effects on advertising’s ability to 
raise producer w elfare (table 3). For exam ple, a 0.5%  increase in either b ee f or pork advertising 
reduces poultry’s total flexibility from  0.050 to  0.045; i f  b ee f and pork respond sim ultaneously 
w ith a 1% increase in advertising, poultry’s flexibility is reduced further to  0.031. However, 
com petitor response is not alw ays detrimental. In particular, poultry advertising has a “halo” 
effect w ith respect to the m eat group, w hich m eans that increases in poultry advertising tend to 
enlarge the total flexibilities for b eef and pork. Thus, the inference from  the tw o-good case that 
com petitor response reduces the total flexibility tends to break down w hen substitution 
possibilities are enlarged. The basic reason is that w hen the analysis is extended beyond two 
goods, the adding-up condition perm its som e cross-advertising elasticities to  be positive, as
9Technically, the m odel does not take explicit account o f  tax shifting so the spillover 
effects will tend to  be overstated in the case o f negative spillovers and understated in the case o f 
positive spillovers (since, for example, the b eef levy raises the price o f pork and vice versa). 
How ever, K innucan and M iao’s analysis suggests that levy cross effects are m odest, so the bias 
should be minimal.
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B rester and Schroeder’s estim ates reveal. D epending on the relative m agnitudes o f the positive 
cross-advertising elasticities, it is possible for com petitor responses to  be reinforcing rather than 
antagonistic.
Overall, the negative cross effects o f  b ee f and pork advertising tend to  be outw eighed by 
the positive cross effect o f  poultry advertising. As a consequence, i f  poultry jo in s pork or b ee f in 
retaliation, the net effect tends to  be positive (for equal increases in advertising expenditure). 
Conversely, i f  poultry fails to respond, retaliation by either pork or b ee f tends to  be w elfare 
decreasing. A lthough the negative spillovers from  pork and b ee f advertising are about equal in 
size, ow ing to  beef’ s relatively small “no response” total flexibility (0.012), the b ee f industry 
tends to  be m ore adversely affected by pork advertising than vice versa. In particular, w hereas 
an isolated 0.5%  increase in b ee f advertising reduces pork’s total flexibility from  0.047 to  0.040, 
an isolated 0.5%  increase in pork advertising reduces beef’ s total flexibility to  -0 .0009.10 That a 
retaliatory response from  pork can render b ee f advertising unprofitable at the m argin highlights 
the potential im portance o f  this issue for advertising benefit-cost analysis. Clearly, as the cross 
flexibilities in table 3 indicate, advertising has distributional consequences, w hich m ay affect the 
desirability o f advertising as a policy instrument.
10 W ith the m aintained hypothesis that advertising m essages are strategic substitutes, i.e., 
the CREs are negative in sign, A lston, Freebairn, and Jam es com e to sim ilar conclusions. That 
is, in the non-cooperative case w here the m eat industries optim ize individually, b ee f industry ad 
expenditures are too low. A n opposite result obtains in the cooperative case w here m eat 
industries choose advertising levels to  m axim ize jo in t producer surplus.
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Concluding Comments
The basic theme of this research is that Buse’s concept of total response can be usefully extended 
to the analysis of advertising effects. Specifically, we show that just as the total price response 
tends to be less elastic than the partial price response, so too does the total advertising response 
tend to be less elastic than the partial advertising response. One implication is that consumption 
impacts based on partial advertising elasticities will tend to be exaggerated. Since empirical 
estimates of partial advertising elasticities are minute to begin with (typically less than 0.08, see 
Ferrero et al.), this implies that advertising in general is a blunt instrument for achieving changes 
in consumption, be it decreases in tobacco or alcohol or increases in fruits and vegetables or fish.
As for the economic impacts of advertising, the total advertising flexibility concept 
developed in this paper serves two useful purposes. First, it provides a simple metric for 
determining whether advertising is welfare increasing or decreasing at the margin from the 
producer perspective. Second, it provides a framework for unifying previous results with respect 
to optimal intensity. Specifically, we show that the total advertising flexibility sets the lower 
limit on the optimal advertising-sales ratio (when opportunity cost is zero), and subsumes the 
Dorfman-Steiner/Nerlove-Waugh theorems as special cases. Applying the total flexibility 
concept to U.S. meats, it appears that the beef, pork and poultry industries are sub-optimizing 
with respect to their investments in advertising. However, from the beef industry’s perspective 
this conclusion hinges on the assumption that the retaliatory response from pork brand 
advertisers is minimal, which needs to be tested.
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Table 1. Parameter Values for Beef, Pork, Poultry, and All Other Goods, United
States
Item D efinition Valuea
Beef Pork Poultry Other
0 1j Demand elasticities w.r.t. beef -0.56 0.10 0.05 0.41
0 2j Demand elasticities w.r.t. pork 0.23 -0.69 0.04 0.43
0 3j Demand elasticities w.r.t. poultry 0.21 0.07 -0.33 0.05
0 4j Demand elasticities w.r.t.other goods 0.009 0.004 0.0002 -0.01
Pi1B Brand adv. elasticities for beef 0.006 0.006 0.001 -0.0002
Pi1G Generic adv. elasticities for beef 0.006 -0.009 -0.011 0.00002
Pi2B Brand adv. elasticities for pork -0.013 0.033 -0.008 -0.00001
Pi2G Generic adv elasticities for pork 0.002 -.0005 -0.010 0.00001
Pi3B Brand adv. elasticities for poultry 0.017 0.004 0.047 -0.0006
^i Supply elasticity13 0.15 0.40 0.90 2.0
Farm-retail price transmission elast.c 0.53 0.34 0.43 1.0
Wi x i Farm  value (billion dollars) d 30.0 10.1 6.3 --
0 iB Brand advertising intensity (%) d 0.007 0.57 0.48 --
0 iG Generic advertising intensity (%) d 0.083 0.11 0 --
a Unless indicated otherwise, values are taken from Brester and Schroeder. Note: cross-advertising elasticities in
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each row refer to spillover (not spill-in) effects (e.g., $31B = 0.001 is beef advertising’s effect on poultry demand, not 
poultry advertising’s effect on beef demand).
b Values for beef and pork are the same used by Wohlgenant; value for poultry is taken from Tomek and Robinson 
(p. 61); value for other goods is a guesstimate.
c Estimates for beef, pork, and poultry are based on farmer’s cost share computed from Elitzak for 1990-95; estimate 
for “other goods” is set to one since farm-level elasticity is not defined.
d Farm value and intensity (advertising expenditure divided by farm value multiplied by 100) refer to 1993, the last 
year in Brester and Schroeder’s analysis. Farm revenue data were taken from USDC.
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Table 2. Farm-Level Total Advertising Elasticities and Flexibilities for U.S. Meats with
Comparisons to Partial Elasticities and Observed Advertising Intensities
Itema Beef
Brand Generic
Pork
Brand Generic
Poultry
Short-run:
Total Elasticity ($iiT) 0.0014 0.0010 0.0134 -0.0001 0.0407
Total Flexibility (aiiT) 0.0181 0.0136 0.0668 -0.0005 0.0905
Total/Partial Elast. Ratio 0.23 0.17 0.41 0.21 0.87
($iiT/$ ii)
Flex./Intensity Ratio (a iiT/0 i) 258.9 16.4 11.7 -0.5 18.8
Long-run:
Total Elasticity ($iiT) 0.0022 0.0018 0.0187 -0.0001 0.0449
Total Flexibility (aiiT) 0.0144 0.0121 0.0467 -0.0003 0.0499
Total/Partial Elast. Ratio 0.36 0.30 0.57 0.20 0.96
(PiiT/Pii)
Flex./Intensity Ratio (a iiT/0 i) 206.3 14.5 8.2 -0.2 10.4
a Short-run results are based on supply elasticities set to one half the values given in table 1; long-run results are
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based on the reported supply elasticities.
Table 3. Total Advertising Flexibilities for U.S. Meats with Competitor Response
Commodity/Scenarioa Direct Spillover Effects
Effect
Beef Pork Poultry Other
Beef:
(i) No response 0.0121 -0.0121 -0.0095 0.000030
(ii) Pork responds -0.0009 -- 0.0113 -0.0142 0.000012
(iii) Poultry responds 0.0328 -- -0.0044 0.0154 -0.000064
(iv) Both respond 0.0198 0.0190 0.0107 -0.000082
27
(v) Both respond in kind 
Pork:
0.0275 0.0501 0.0309 -0.000193
(i) No response 0.0467 -0.0260 -- -0.0094 -0.000036
(ii) Beef responds 0.0407 -0.0200 -- -0.0142 -0.000021
(iii) Poultry responds 0.0545 -0.0053 -- 0.0155 -0.000129
(iv) Both respond 0.0484 0.0007 -- 0.0108 -0.000114
(v ) Both respond in kind 
Poultry:
0.0501 0.0275 -- 0.0309 -0.000193
(i) No response 0.0499 0.0415 0.0155 -0.000188
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(ii) Beef responds 0.0451 0.0475 0.0094 -0.000173
(iii) Pork responds 0.0452 0.0284 0.0389 -- -0.000205
(iv) Both respond 0.0404 0.0345 0.0328 -- -0.000190
(v) Both respond in kind 0.0309 0.0275 0.0501 -0.000193
a Scenarios (ii) - (iv) refer to a 0.5% increase in competitor advertising per 1% increase in own-advertising; scenario 
(v) refers to a 1% increase in competitors’ advertising.
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Appendix: Relationship between Total Flexibility and Optimal Intensity
The relationship between total advertising flexibility and optimal advertising intensity may be 
derived from the zth industry’s “profit” function:
(A.1) Bi = jpi°<2'i° - 1oq S  (t) dt - a
where Bi is net producer surplus, i.e., quasi-rent after subtracting advertising cost,p° and qio are 
price and quantity in competitive equilibrium, and S  (qi) = p i is the inverse supply function. 
Letting pi denote opportunity cost (e.g., marginal return from research (Wohlgenant)), (A.1) 
yields the first-order condition:
p io dqio/dai + qio dpio/dai - S  (qio) dqi/dai - 1 = pi, 
which, since p io = S  (qio), simplifies to:
(A.2) qio dpio/dai = pi + 1.
Multiplying and dividing the left-hand side of (A.2) by a i/pio yields:
0i-1 pi*/a* = pi + 1,
wherep i*/ai* is the reduced-form elasticity of own price with respect to own advertising, herein 
denoted a iiT. Replacing p i*/ai* with a iiT and solving the above relation for 0i yields:
(A.3) 0io' = a / / (p i  + 1).
where 0io is optimal intensity in the absence of tax shifting.
To account for tax shifting, (A.3) may be rewritten as follows (Kinnucan 1999):
(A.4) 0io = + Si)
where S i = - 0ii /(ei - 0ii) is producer incidence of the advertising levy. If ei = 0 then S i = 1 and
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(A.4) reduces to (A.3). In general ei > 0, which means Q; < 1 and (A.3) understates the incentive 
to promote. (A.4) corrects for this deficiency.
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